Sobre la deuda externa argentina...
...y algunas apreciaciones con respecto al destino de las divisas.
Financial times publica el crecimiento del endeudamiento público en los últimos años y surgen un par de curiosidades para alguien como yo que casi no entiende de economía.
En el gráfico podemos ver el notable incremento de la deuda desde que llegó Macri al poder a fines de 2015. Allí vemos que se incrementó un 50% la deuda en dos años y medio! Pasó de unos 90 mil millones a 140 mil millones de dolares en ese período.
Reitero, son números gruesos, no soy especialista, para buscar precisiones consultar sitios de economía.
Otra cuestión que me llama la atención es que una suma similar a ese incremento se fugó en el mismo período, 10 mil millones en 2016, 22 mil millones en 2017 y más de 10 mil millones en lo que va de 2018, un total que supera los 40 mil millones de referencia que menciono en el gráfico.
Cuando escucho editorializar sin malas intenciones a gente que se opone a este gobierno y decir que nos sucede lo mismo desde hace 70 años lamento no coincidir con el análisis, esto no nos sucede esto se está haciendo, como dice el nuevo eslogan de campaña de Cambiemos: "Está pasando"!
No puede ser casual que se lleven todo el dinero, que nada se invierta, que no haya un plan productivo o de crecimiento sino un simple plan de saqueo.
Esto solo puede ser posible con la enorme manipulación de la que somos víctimas.
IXX, may2018
https://www.ft.com/content/e9254e3a-593e-11e8-b8b2-d6ceb45fa9d0
Why Argentina has returned to the IMF — in charts Macri hopes loan could restore confidence in his economic plan after peso sell-off President Mauricio Macri blamed his predecessors for the parlous state of Argentina’s finances as he announced the approach to the IMF © Reuters Share on Twitter (opens new window) Share on Facebook (opens new window) Share on LinkedIn (opens new window) Save Save to myFT Benedict Mander in Buenos Aires MAY 18, 2018 Print this page23 Argentina severed ties with the International Monetary Fund 12 years ago, swearing never to go back again — which is why President Mauricio Macri’s decision to seek a new loan from the fund shocked his nation. Faced with a run on Argentina’s currency, Mr Macri alighted on the move as a forceful — if controversial — answer to investors losing confidence in his plan to bring back order gradually to Argentina’s economy. What are the difficulties he is trying to address? Share this graphic A three-week rout of Argentina’s peso has wiped out about a fifth of its value against the dollar, making it the worst performing emerging market currency this year. At least the central bank managed to roll over all $25bn in short-term notes that matured this week — which could otherwise have been sold for dollars, putting further pressure on the peso — and so restored calm to markets. Share this graphic The recent attack on the currency is only likely to complicate the Argentine government’s drive to tackle apparently conflicting objectives: bringing down inflation while simultaneously stimulating growth. Many argue one reason the peso was overvalued earlier this year is because of fears a devaluation could further stoke inflation, which is running hot at a 25.5 per cent annual rate. Nicolás Dujovne, Treasury minister, insisted this week that the figure for May would be lower, but he admitted that the peso’s decline would have an impact. Meanwhile, sky-high interest rates, which were jacked up to 40 per cent earlier this month in an attempt to stem the run on the currency, could have a negative impact on growth — although analysts say the effect is limited by the relatively low level of credit in Argentina’s economy, at around 15 per cent of gross domestic product. Share this graphic Eliminating the fiscal deficit lies at the heart of Mr Macri’s economic programme, as it has always been the root cause of Argentina’s endemic economic crises.
The president’s commitment to a “gradualist” agenda — because of social and political opposition to more vigorous spending cuts — means that progress has been limited so far. The most important change is the composition of the shortfall. The primary fiscal deficit, which excludes interest payments on the national debt, was almost 45 per cent lower last month than it was in April 2017, accelerating the progress that the Macri government made last year.
The overall deficit remains high, however, because of higher interest payments resulting from growing debt levels. The IMF may require the government to make quicker progress on reducing the deficit, but it remains to be seen how society at large would react to that. Share this graphic Until the end of the commodity boom, Argentina enjoyed twin surpluses in the budget and current account. But while the Macri government works towards bringing the fiscal deficit back under control, the current account deficit has risen rapidly in the past two years. That is partly because imports have rebounded as demand has grown internally. International investors saw the current account deficit as making the peso vulnerable.
The currency’s previous overvaluation has also played a role. Many are particularly critical of Argentines’ penchant for travelling abroad to go shopping for electronic goods and clothing that are relatively cheaper elsewhere. A weaker peso will help to close the current account deficit. Share this graphic Despite using up more than 10 per cent of its foreign exchange reserves to defend the peso during the recent rout, they are still at reasonable levels — and certainly much higher than when Mr Macri took office with almost no liquid reserves at all. Still, they are considerably lower than the rest of the region, equivalent to 8 per cent of gross domestic product in 2017, compared to an average in Latin America of 17 per cent, according to the Institute of International Finance. A loan from the IMF could provide confidence that Argentina has enough liquidity to protect itself against further attacks on the currency.
Share this graphicArgentina’s foreign-currency debt has grown exponentially in the past two years as Mr Macri has relied on international investors to plug the deficit without resorting to printing pesos — a strategy that the previous government preferred, with disastrous consequences for inflation. Going to the IMF for hard currency rather than printing money is an extension of that approach, and an attempt to prevent a currency devaluation from turning into a debt crisis. Although external debt levels at just over 50 per cent of gross domestic product are roughly similar to those just before the economic crisis of 2001-02, the growing economy and the relative strength of Argentina’s banks make the situation very different. The level of bad debts in the banking system is less than 2 per cent versus 20 per cent in 2001. Also, the bulk of Argentina’s financing needs for this year have already been covered. If Mr Macri and the IMF agree the mooted $30bn in assistance — with much cheaper interest rates than Argentina can get on Wall Street — the government may not have to return to the international markets before the end of the president’s term next year. Copyright The Financial Times Limited 2018. All rights reserved.
