Cooperación según Stiglitz
IXX-2014
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miércoles, 17 de diciembre de 2014
Nobel de Economía: “EE.UU. se verá obligado a cooperar con China aunque no le guste”
" Lo mejor que puede hacer EEUU en respuesta al creciente liderazgo de China es poner orden en su propia casa, escribe el nobel de economía Joseph Stiglitz en una nota publicada en Vanity Fair " - " China ha sacado de la línea de pobreza a más de 500 millones de personas, mientras que la clase media estadounidense está entrando en un período de estancamiento, indica Stiglitz. "
ECONOMÍA: 2014 es el último año de EEUU como mayor potencia mundial
Montserrat Mestre14/12/2014EconomíaChina, EEUU, Joseph Stiglitz
Lo mejor que puede hacer EEUU en respuesta al creciente liderazgo de China es poner orden en su propia casa, escribe el nobel de economía Joseph Stiglitz en una nota publicada en Vanity Fair, tituladaEl siglo de China, que puede leerse en http://www.vanityfair.com/business/2015/01/china-worlds-largest-economy
Es poco probable que China, como líder potencial de la economía global, se adapte al orden mundial establecido por Occidente, por lo que EE.UU., al perder su liderazgo, tendrá que seguir los dictados de China para conseguir la estabilidad del planeta, cree el nobel de economía Joseph Stiglitz.
China entrará en el 2015 como el líder mundial en la economía de acuerdo con la metodología basada en la paridad de poder adquisitivo, que da una base muy fiable para comparar el ingreso per cápita en distintos países. Estos datos sorprendieron a muchos en EE.UU. y resultaron ser reveladores en el contexto de las diferencias entre China y EE.UU., opina el economista estadounidense Joseph Stiglitz en su artículo para la revista ‘Vanity Fair’.
El ascenso de China atrae la atención de otros países hacia el modelo social chino, exponiendo desfavorablemente el modelo norteamericano, cree el nobel de economía. Actualmente, el nivel de vida de una familia estadounidense media es peor que hace 25 años, y el número de pobres en EE.UU. está creciendo.
Mientras tanto, la mayoría de los chinos han visto mejorar significativamente su nivel de vida en el contexto de un rápido crecimiento económico: China ha sacado de la línea de pobreza a más de 500 millones de personas, mientras que la clase media estadounidense está entrando en un período de estancamiento, indica Stiglitz. “Un modelo económico que no sirve a los intereses de la mayoría de los ciudadanos no puede ser un modelo a seguir para todos los demás”, aseguró el economista.
En un momento en que China se está convirtiendo en la primera economía del mundo, escribe Joseph Stiglitz, se está formando una nueva arquitectura de la cooperación internacional, la estabilidad de la cual en muchos aspectos depende de la reacción de Washington a la pérdida de su liderazgo global. Washington podría aplicar una “política de contención” con el objetivo de limitar la influencia de China en el mundo, lo que Stiglitz considera superficial y contraproducente. “EE.UU. tendrá que cooperar con China, le guste o no”, resume el Nobel de economía.
http://actualidad.rt.com/economia/160299-nobel-economia-eeuu-obligado-cooperar-china
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http://www.vanityfair.com/business/2015/01/china-worlds-largest-economy
The Chinese Century
Without fanfare—indeed, with some misgivings about its new status—China has just overtaken the United States as the world’s largest economy. This is, and should be, a wake-up call—but not the kind most Americans might imagine.By Joseph E. Stiglitz
SOFT POWER For America, the best response to China is to put our own house in order.
When the history of 2014 is written, it will take note of a large fact that has received little attention: 2014 was the last year in which the United States could claim to be the world’s largest economic power. China enters 2015 in the top position, where it will likely remain for a very long time, if not forever. In doing so, it returns to the position it held through most of human history.
Comparing the gross domestic product of different economies is very difficult. Technical committees come up with estimates, based on the best judgments possible, of what are called “purchasing-power parities,” which enable the comparison of incomes in various countries. These shouldn’t be taken as precise numbers, but they do provide a good basis for assessing the relative size of different economies. Early in 2014, the body that conducts these international assessments—the World Bank’s International Comparison Program—came out with new numbers. (The complexity of the task is such that there have been only three reports in 20 years.) The latest assessment, released last spring, was more contentious and, in some ways, more momentous than those in previous years. It was more contentious precisely because it was more momentous: the new numbers showed that China would become the world’s largest economy far sooner than anyone had expected—it was on track to do so before the end of 2014.
The source of contention would surprise many Americans, and it says a lot about the differences between China and the U.S.—and about the dangers of projecting onto the Chinese some of our own attitudes. Americans want very much to be No. 1—we enjoy having that status. In contrast, China is not so eager. According to some reports, the Chinese participants even threatened to walk out of the technical discussions. For one thing, China did not want to stick its head above the parapet—being No. 1 comes with a cost. It means paying more to support international bodies such as the United Nations. It could bring pressure to take an enlightened leadership role on issues such as climate change. It might very well prompt ordinary Chinese to wonder if more of the country’s wealth should be spent on them. (The news about China’s change in status was in fact blacked out at home.) There was one more concern, and it was a big one: China understands full well America’s psychological preoccupation with being No. 1—and was deeply worried about what our reaction would be when we no longer were.
Of course, in many ways—for instance, in terms of exports and household savings—China long ago surpassed the United States. With savings and investment making up close to 50 percent of G.D.P., the Chinese worry about having too much savings, just as Americans worry about having too little. In other areas, such as manufacturing, the Chinese overtook the U.S. only within the past several years. They still trail America when it comes to the number of patents awarded, but they are closing the gap.
The areas where the United States remains competitive with China are not always ones we’d most want to call attention to. The two countries have comparable levels of inequality. (Ours is the highest in the developed world.) China outpaces America in the number of people executed every year, but the U.S. is far ahead when it comes to the proportion of the population in prison (more than 700 per 100,000 people). China overtook the U.S. in 2007 as the world’s largest polluter, by total volume, though on a per capita basis we continue to hold the lead. The United States remains the largest military power, spending more on our armed forces than the next top 10 nations combined (not that we have always used our military power wisely). But the bedrock strength of the U.S. has always rested less on hard military power than on “soft power,” most notably its economic influence. That is an essential point to remember.
Tectonic shifts in global economic power have obviously occurred before, and as a result we know something about what happens when they do. Two hundred years ago, in the aftermath of the Napoleonic Wars, Great Britain emerged as the world’s dominant power. Its empire spanned a quarter of the globe. Its currency, the pound sterling, became the global reserve currency—as sound as gold itself. Britain, sometimes working in concert with its allies, imposed its own trade rules. It could discriminate against importation of Indian textiles and force India to buy British cloth. Britain and its allies could also insist that China keep its markets open to opium, and when China, knowing the drug’s devastating effect, tried to close its borders, the allies twice went to war to maintain the free flow of this product.
Britain’s dominance was to last a hundred years and continued even after the U.S. surpassed Britain economically, in the 1870s. There’s always a lag (as there will be with the U.S. and China). The transitional event was World War I, when Britain achieved victory over Germany only with the assistance of the United States. After the war, America was as reluctant to accept its potential new responsibilities as Britain was to voluntarily give up its role. Woodrow Wilson did what he could to construct a postwar world that would make another global conflict less likely, but isolationism at home meant that the U.S. never joined the League of Nations. In the economic sphere, America insisted on going its own way—passing the Smoot-Hawley tariffs and bringing to an end an era that had seen a worldwide boom in trade. Britain maintained its empire, but gradually the pound sterling gave way to the dollar: in the end, economic realities dominate. Many American firms became global enterprises, and American culture was clearly ascendant.
World War II was the next defining event. Devastated by the conflict, Britain would soon lose virtually all of its colonies. This time the U.S. did assume the mantle of leadership. It was central in creating the United Nations and in fashioning the Bretton Woods agreements, which would underlie the new political and economic order. Even so, the record was uneven. Rather than creating a global reserve currency, which would have contributed so much to worldwide economic stability—as John Maynard Keynes had rightly argued—the U.S. put its own short-term self-interest first, foolishly thinking it would gain by having the dollar become the world’s reserve currency. The dollar’s status is a mixed blessing: it enables the U.S. to borrow at a low interest rate, as others demand dollars to put into their reserves, but at the same time the value of the dollar rises (above what it otherwise would have been), creating or exacerbating a trade deficit and weakening the economy.
For 45 years after World War II, global politics was dominated by two superpowers, the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., representing two very different visions both of how to organize and govern an economy and a society and of the relative importance of political and economic rights. Ultimately, the Soviet system was to fail, as much because of internal corruption, unchecked by democratic processes, as anything else. Its military power had been formidable; its soft power was increasingly a joke. The world was now dominated by a single superpower, one that continued to invest heavily in its military. That said, the U.S. was a superpower not just militarily but also economically.
The United States then made two critical mistakes. First, it inferred that its triumph meant a triumph for everything it stood for. But in much of the Third World, concerns about poverty—and the economic rights that had long been advocated by the left—remained paramount. The second mistake was to use the short period of its unilateral dominance, between the fall of the Berlin Wall and the fall of Lehman Brothers, to pursue its own narrow economic interests—or, more accurately, the economic interests of its multi-nationals, including its big banks—rather than to create a new, stable world order. The trade regime the U.S. pushed through in 1994, creating the World Trade Organization, was so unbalanced that, five years later, when another trade agreement was in the offing, the prospect led to riots in Seattle. Talking about free and fair trade, while insisting (for instance) on subsidies for its rich farmers, has cast the U.S. as hypocritical and self-serving.
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